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While the introduction of the GST continues to dominate economic and political
debate in Australia, in terms of its efficiency, equity and compliance cost
implications, a neglected but important aspect of the tax refonn package focuses
on Commonwealth-State financial relations. A central feature of the reform is the
replacement of a set ofnarrowly based and inefficient indirect taxes levied by the
Commonwealth and State Governments with the national GST. This is accompanied
by substantial reductions in personal income tax rates. giving rise to important
implications for the degree of vertical fiscal imbalance (VA). the efficiency of the
States' tax regimes and the capacity of the States to maintain discretion over their
fiscal regimes. The Queensiand Government has claimed that the initial State
compensation arrangements were grossly inequitable, and that subsequent features
of the initiative will impede the Queensland Government's capacity to maintain
its low taxation status.
This paper concentrates on the themes ofequity. VFI, State tax efficiency and the
question of whether Queensland's days as a low tax State have been ended.
Although the degree of VA can be expected to increase, the elimination of
selected State taxes and their replacement with the national GST should facilitate
efficiency gains. Moreover, it is concluded that the capacity for the Queensland
Government to adjust the remaining components of its tax base, together with the
reapplication of the Commonwealth Grants Commission methodology for
distributing GST revenues to the States from 2002-03, effectively means that the
national GST need not pose a substantial threat to the Queensland Government's
capacity to maintain its low tax status. The paper does not attempt to assess the
precise impact of the national GST on the economic perfonnance of particular
industries in Queensland, which would require extensive econometric and statistical
modelling and is outside the scope of this paper.
The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and shouId not be attributed
to their employers.
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1. SHORTCOMINGS OF AUSTRALIA'S TAXATION SYSTEM
The Australian tax system has attracted a great deal of professional attention and
criticism. When assessed against the standard tax design criteriaofequity, efficiency
and simplicity, Australia's pre-reform taxation arrangements have left many
economists - including Mathews (1985), Smith (1993) and Freebairn (1997)-
concluding that rather than having a tax system which pays due regard to the
principles of tax design, Australia has had one which in fact operates perversely in
relation to every major criterion.
Amongst the central features ofthe present reforms are the replacement ofa raft
of narrowly-based, inefficient and inequitable indirect taxes levied by the
Commonwealth and State Governments with an efficiency-enhancing broad-based
goods and services tax (GST), together with major reductions in personal income
tax rates. This, however, has implications for the degree of YFI, which is typically
defined as "disparities between revenue sources and expenditure requirements
among the various levels of government" (Rowand Duhs, I998a, p.70) and which
has already been condemned as "extreme and dysfunctional" in the Australian
federation (Rowand Duhs, 1998b). It follows that any efficiency gains secured by
improving the composition ofState taxes must be traded offagainst any inefficiency
consequences of increased YFI. As for YFI, Mathews (1982, pp.15-16) contends
that" ... the States have shown that they are more concerned with political
opportunism than with financial independence, insisting on State rights in virtually
every aspect of public policy except the crucial area of fiscal policy.. ."
In response to the reform package, the Queensland Government claimed that
initial features of the transitional State compensation arrangements were grossly
inequitable, and that subsequent features ofthe initiative will threaten Queensland's
low taxation status. This paper challenges the claim that the national GST
necessarily threatens Queensland's low taxation status. The reapplication of the
Commonwealth Grants Commission methodology for distributing GST revenues
to the States from 2002-2003 (originally 2003-04) effectively means that the
national GST need not pose a threat to the Queensland Government's capacity to
maintain the State's low level of taxation relative to other Australian States.
2. COMMONWEALTH GOVERNMENT TAX REFORM INITIATIVE
Apart from the introduction of a broad-based GST and major reductions in personal
income tax rates, the national tax reform plan initially provided for:
• repeal of the Commonwealth wholesale sales tax from I July 2000;
• abolition of State bed taxes (from I July 2000), financial institutions duty (I
January 2001) and debits tax (from I January 2001) - none of which was
levied in Queensland;
• removal of State stamp duties on marketable securities, business
conveyances (other than real property), leases, mortgages, debentures,
bonds and other loan securities, credit arrangements, instalment purchase
arrangements, rental arrangements and cheques, bills of exchange and
promissory notes (from I July 200 I);
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• distribution of GST revenues to the States in accordance with the principles
of horizontal fiscal capacity equalisation, subject to transitional
compensation arrangements whereby the States will be no worse off
financially in aggregate than they would be under the current arrangements;
and
cessation of Commonwealth financial assistance grants (FAGs) to the States
on I July 2000, but continuation of Commonwealth specific purpose
payments (SPPs) to the States (Queensland Treasury, 1998, pp.27-28;
Robinson, 1998, p.IS).
Subsequent negotiations between the Commonwealth Government and the
Australian Democrats resulted in revisions, including the exclusion ofunprocessed
food from the GST base and reductions in the proposed personal income tax cuts
for individuals earning between $50,000 and $75,000 per annum (Johnstone, 1999,
p.l). Unsurprisingly, the States objected to the reduced revenue collections
pursuant to these amendments, and the extent of the originally proposed State tax
reform was scaled back. Moreover, the Commonwealth is expected to retain any
increase in GST revenue in the early years by offsetting its Budget Balancing
Assistance to Statesand Territories. Business community supportfor the tax reform
packageeased its introduction, and reflected acceptance that the indirect tax system
was failing to raise sufficient revenue, inevitably leading to the need to find either
alternative sources of tax revenue or lower levels of expenditure (Bum, 2000).
For states and territories, national tax reform ultimately embodied revised
funding arrangements with the Commonwealth in the Intergovernmental Agreement
on the Reform of Commonwealth-State Financial Relations (IGA). The main
features of the IGA are the abolition of particular State taxes, discontinuation of
annual FAGs to the States from I July 2000, and distribution of all GST revenues
to the States. The States also agreed to reduce State gambling taxes to "make room"
for the GST. In effect, the IGA disadvantages Queensland taxpayers and provides
per capita tax reductions in NSW almost four times as large as those in Queensland
in 2001-02 (Queensland Government 2000, p.59). The impactofthe reform ofState
taxes will not be spread evenly across the States (Queensland Government 2000,
p.63). The major difference between the old and new arrangements is that, under
the IGA, untied revenue grants will be determined by an agreed formula, ratherthan
by negotiation at the annual Premier's Conference.
3. EQillTY IMPLICATIONS OF INTERIM REVENUE-SHARING
ARRANGEMENTS
The Commonwealth Government's tax reform package provides for the distribution
of GST revenues to the States in accordance with the principle of horizontal fiscal
capacity equalisation. During the transitional phase (2000-01 to 2002-03), however,
GST revenues will be distributed to the States in accordance with the requirement
"that the States will be no worse off financially in aggregate than they would be
under the current arrangements. Payments under this aggregate funding guarantee
will be made so that the budgetary position of each State and Territory will be no
worse off in each year" (Queensland Treasury, 1998, p.29). The importance of the
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interim funding approach is that it represents a shift away from the principle of
fiscal capacity equalisation to one premised on fiscal performance equalization,
which seeks to compensate individual States for the loss of the State taxes
earmarked for abolition (e.g. bed taxes and financial institutions duty). While the
States may have been left in unchanged revenue positions, individual (Queensland)
taxpayers have not been left with unchanged overall tax obligations. Thus the real-
politik of leaving States/taxpayers in unchanged tax positions is somewhat
ambivalent.
In this context it is apparent that the tax reform compensation arrangements
initially proposed were justifiably criticised by the Queensland Government (see
Beattie, 1998; QueenslandTreasury, 1998 and 1999; Robinson, 1998). Preservation
of the higher service provision level in New South Wales, Victoria and South
Australia will be financed by the national GST, and thus in part by Queensland
taxpayers who had not themselves previously financed or received services at that
higher level. Since fewer State taxes are being replaced by the GST in Queensland
_ because of its earlier decisions to opt for a lower tax position without reliance on
particular laXes used in other States - Queenslanders face the imposition of an
additional GST on top of a relatively unchanged set of State taxes. Queensland
Treasury statistics reveal that .... in respect of the State taxes proposed to be
abolished, Queensland collected $372 per capita in 1997-98, compared with $613
per capita in New South Wales and $533 per capita nationally.....(Queensland
Treasury, 1998, p.28; and 1999, pAl. Therefore, taxpayers in New South Wales,
Victoria and South Australia would experience a reduction in their tax burden in
respect oflaxes impacting on State budgets, while for Queenslanders, there will be
an increase in their lax burden. In 2002-03, for example, it is estimated that
Queensland taxes abolished would have reached $404 per capita. In the same year,
the estimated level ofGST required to abolish State taxes nationally would impose
a $560 burden on each Queenslander" (Queensland Treasury, 1998, p.28).
Considerable doubts also surrounded the precise fiscal impact of the
Commonwealth's initial proposal on State finances. For instance, Commonwealth
government estimates published by Queensland Treasury (1998, p.29) suggest that
approximately $1.26 billion in FAGs would be required to achieve the outcome that
the States in aggregate will not be left in an inferior financial position. However,
Queensland Treasury (1998, p.29) maintains that the Commonwealth's estimate of
State revenue forgone was underestimated by approximately $3.2 billion. While
the net impact on the States' budgetary positions is important, even more pressing
is the uncertainty surrounding the capacity of the States to finance the anticipated
State fiscal shortfall of about $1.6 billion over the period 2000-01 to 2002-03.
Anticipated fiscal losses arising from the initial State compensation arrangements
were resolved through subsequent negotiation, however, resulting in increased
commonwealth financial assistance to the states.
Subsequent State government approval of the tax regime's revenue sharing
features was secured via a$1 billion increase in Commonwealth financial assistance
to the States. In Queensland's case, an initially anticipated $465 million per annum
revenue loss was reduced to $130 million per annum via increased Commonwealth
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funding in numerous areas, including housing funding (by $84 million over three
years), tax-equivalents (an additional $54 million) and increased local government
funding ($38 million) (Franklin, 1999). Nevertheless, contrary to the principle of
fiscal capacity equalisation, Queensland taxpayers win in fact be required to
subsidise the removal of bed taxes and financial institutions duty (FlO) by other
States, including New South Wales and Victoria. In short, Queenslanders will be
required to help pay for the continuation ofhigher service levels in the larger States,
despite its earlier decision not to provide such service levels to its own citizens.
According to Cleary (1999, pA), the revised IGA estimates prepared by the
Commonwealth Government reveal that the GST win raise $24.2 binion in the first
year of operation, $3 billion less than the original estimate. Similarly, by 2002-03,
the GST would generate $29.2 binion, compared with the $32.8 billion originally
predicted. Queensland' s fiscal benefit from the revised tax sharing arrangements is
expected to plateau at approximately $500 million per annum in 2005-06 (Lloyd,
1999, p.26). In consequence of such vagaries, continuing uncertainty surrounds the
fiscal package, and its implications for Queensland.
4. IMPLICATIONS FOR VFI
4.1 VFI Defined and Associated Problems
Like other federations, the Australian federation is characterised by vertical fiscal
imbalance (VFl). VFl prevails when one level of government has financial
resources in excessofthe revenue required to fulfil its constitutional responsibilities.
In 1996-97, the Commonwealth Government collected approximately 72 per cent
of total public sector revenues but accounted for only about 54 per cent ofoutlays.
In contrast,the State Governments in 1996-97 collected approximately 24 per cent
oflotal revenues but were responsible for approximately 42 per cent oflotal public
sector outlays (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.70; Rowand Duhs, 1998b, p.56). Such
problems as diminished Stateaccountability andincreased State revenue uncertainty
associated with VFI have come to be seen as impediments to public sector
efficiency and thus to national economic efficiency (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.71;
Rowand Duhs, 1998b, pp.56- 57). The QueenslandGovernment (2000, p.57) noted
that national tax reform win increase the dependence of states and territories on
Commonwealth funding: "In 2000-0 I, Commonwealth grants will represent
47 per cent of Queensland's total revenue, compared with 43 per cent in 1999-
2000." This percentage will be even higher with the further planned abolition of
State taxes under the IGA. In short, the Commonwealth's tax reform package win
exacerbate VFl. Table I reports VFl ratios by state for recent years.
Robinson (1998) suggested that the Commonwealth-State revenue-sharing
arrangements will assist in overcoming the States' financial difficulties associated
with revenue uncertainty. According to him (1998, p.15), the revenue sharing
component ofthe reform agenda constitutes" . .. the best feasible revenue guarantees,
short of a formal amendment ofthe Australian Constitution. The new arrangements
offer the states not only considerably greater revenue security but also access to a
revenue stream which will grow in line with increasing community income and
expectations of government."
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TABLE 1
VERTICAL FISCAL IMBALANCE RATIOS BY JURISDICTION,
1992-93 TO 1997-98
Vear NSW VIC Qld SA WA TAS All States Commonw
and wealth
Territories
1992-93 0.56 0.52 0.57 0.41 0.48 0.43 0.51 1.10
1993-94 0.54 0.62 0.64 0.52 0.54 0.46 0.56 1.13
1994-95 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.50 0.56 0.48 0.55 1.20
1995-96 0.54 0.77 0.60 0.55 0.59 0.47 0.58 1.22
1996-97 0.64 0.65 0.59 0.53 0.55 0.47 0.60 1.28
1997-98 0.58 0.54 0.57 0.49 0.61 0.43 0.55 1.36
Source: ABS (Various) Catalogue No. 5512.0.
Note: The ratios reponed are of own·source revenue to own expenditure.
Allhough revenue sharing does partially salisfy the States' desire for greater
predictability in their annual funding, and although it also ensures the retention of
auniform, centrally administered income tax system and the avoidance ofanumber,
of potential allocalive inefficiencies and distortions that might be associated with
handing back specific tax powers to sub-national jurisdictions (Rowand Duhs,
1998a, pp.74-75), revenue sharing nonetheless does not fully address all the
concerns surrounding VFI. To the extent that it will not parallel a reduction in
Commonwealth specific purpose grants, for example, the proposed package does
not reduce the Commonwealth's capacity to enforce its expenditure preferences
upon the States. Moreover, the accountability gains, ifany, are likely to be marginal
because revenue sharing passes responsibility to the States only notionally.
Whether States' shares are constitutionally guaranteed or legislatively determined,
individual States can legitimately present themselves as having no control over the
definition of the tax base, the setting of the overall tax rates, or the precise details
of the revenue sharing formula - and hence, having no direct responsibility for
revenue raised. As pointed out by Queensland Treasury (1999, pjii), "while the
resultant revenue will be distributed to the States, the GST will remain a
Commonwealth tax to be varied only with the support of the Commonwealth
Parliament. Rather than redress VFl, the proposed reforms wouldfurther reduce
the revenue autonomy ofindividual States and Territories." It is again apparent that
VFI will be exacerbated, not reduced, by the proposed refonns.
Moreover, to the extent that the predictability ofState funding is enhanced, the
Commonwealth's fiscal flexibility may be diminished and the effectiveness of
Commonwealth macroeconomic policy tools (e.g. aimed at increasing public
sector savings) could be reduced, because the Commonwealth may have no control
over whether the States choose to spend or save their share of any increase in tax
revenues. In consequence, it is unclear that the proposedrevenue sharing arrangement
justifies the loss of flexibility and macroeconomic policy control for the
Commonwealth (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.75).
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4.2 Efficiency and Equity Consequences of Replacing State Taxes with the
National GST
The Commonwealth Government's initiative has involved the replacement of
various State taxes with the nationally levied GST. Evaluating the equity and
efficiency implications of the changes therefore requires a comparison between the
equity and efficiency characteristics ofthe GST and those of the pertinent State taxes.
In terms of efficiency, State taxes perform poorly. Payroll tax represents the
largest source of State taxation revenue, even though it is a politically unwelcome
and contentious tax on employment. It is the only broadly-based State tax and, at
least on that ground, is less distortionary than the other taxes (Ryan, 1995; Crowe,
1996; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998). Most other State taxes are distortionary and
encourage substitution ofuntaxed forms ofeconomic activity. Whilst some ofthese
distortionary taxes such as tobacco and liquor franchise fees can be justified on
externality grounds, many caqnot (Rowand Duhs, I998a). Although payroll tax is
considered to be a broadly-based tax (albeit one that is criticised during these times
of high unemployment), what is significant is that the States have had no access to
broad-based income taxes, broad-based consumption taxes, or more appropriate
taxes on wealth or the transfer of wealth (Collins, 1993, p.I64; Kerr, 1993, p.72).
The imperfect substitutes of land taxes and stamp duties have been criticised on
both efficiency and equity grounds.
State taxes - often termed "nuisance" taxes - are commonly condemned as
inappropriate sources for major revenues for any level of government in either
federal or unitary systems (Rounds, 1992, pp.4-5; Walsh, 1992, p.6; and Walsh and
Thompson, 1994, p.5).ln this regard, much has been said ofState governments not
having access to growth taxes. Gabbitas' and Eldridges 1998 analysis, which is
largely based on the 1988 Collins Review of the New South Wales tax system,
provides a recent attempt to determine the income elasticity of State taxes (i.e. the
increase in a tax base over time as the economy grows). Table 2 indicates that these
elasticity estimates vary considerably, but average close to one for total State taxes,
indicating that with no change ofthe State tax base or the rate, State tax revenue will
increase in about the same proportion as Gross State Product (GSP).
TABLE 2
INCOME ELASTICITY OF NEW SOUTH WALES' TAXES
Category of tax Average
elasticity
Maximum
elasticity
Minimum
.elasticity
Contracts and conveyances 1.48 5.86 - 3.01
Total stamp duties 1.36 2.51 - 0.68
Payroll tax 1.06 2.03 o. t 5
Land tax 1.12 5.68 0.07
Tobacco franchise 0.65 1.93 - 0.11
Alcohol franchise 0.81 1.57 - 2.54
Gambling taxes 1.14 3.11 0.65
Total taxes 1.09 1.56 0.75
Source: Working Party on Tax Powers (1991), Kerr (1993) and Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998).
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State taxation essentially involves a multiplicity of rates applied to narrow
bases. The narrowing of bases has been largely through politically induced
concessions (e.g. abolition ofdeath duties in 1976 (Gramlich, 1984), and Queensland
Government provision of various payroll tax exemptions and deductions, including
exemptions to employers with an annual payroll of$0.85 million or less (Queensland
Government, 2000). This has facilitated both distortions in resource use and
undesirable equity results. However, while compliance and collection costs render
some State taxes as genuinely "nuisance" taxes, the fact that small amounts of
revenue are collected from multiple bases is not in itself a compelling criticism. As
Walsh (1990, p.66) explains, the ideal distribution of revenue collection across
alternative bases would involve equalising the marginal efficiency costs ofcollection.
It is by no means obvious that this would imply reliance on fewer revenue sources.
Extensive use of narrow-based taxes nonetheless remains difficult to defend on
efficiency or equity grounds. Being narrowly based, State taxes have been levied
heavily on business inputs in some industries (e.g. mining via royalties, payroll tax
and excessive rail freight charges). Taxes such as financial institutions duty and the
bank accounts debits tax, by virtue of their inability to cope with sophisticated
financial instruments and transactions, induce serious distortions (Gabbitas and
Eldridge, 1998, pp.204-205). Despite having only limited taxing powers, the States
and Territories have not fully exploited the broader based taxes available to them,
leading to excessive reliance on inefficient, narrowly based taxes. Even those taxes
with potentially the broadest applications, namely, payroll and land taxes, have
been substantially circumscribed through exemptions and concessions.
Estimates from Western Australia for 1989-90 indicate that the compliance
costs of State taxes are, on the whole, quite acceptable, with the exception of land
tax (Working Party on Tax Powers, 1991, p.21; Kerr, 1993, p.73). However,
Gabbitas and Eldridge (1998, p.43) maintain that "it is difficult to draw fum
conclusions about the cost of administering State taxes across Australia, owing to
differing institutional arrangements between States and the paucity of published
data." Nevertheless, an absence of hannonised bases can result in businesses
operating in different States incurring high compliance costs. In some cases,
substantial interstate rate and base differences facilitate undue base mobility, tax
evasion and high enforcement costs. The use of tax thresholds and multiple rates
tends to be discriminatory and induces problems concerning indexation and
cyclically unstable revenues (Oakes, 1985, pp.64-67; Walsh, 1990, p.67; Collins,
1993, pp.169-170; Kerr, 1993, pp.72-73; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pp.52-54).
As with many Commonwealth taxes, most State taxes perform poorly when
assessed against equity requirements. Both the Collins Review (NSW Tax Task
Force, 1988) and the Nieuwenhuysen Committee (Committee oflnquiry into State
Government Revenue Raising, 1983) have concluded that almost all State taxes are
regressive and do not serve the goal of distributional equity well (see also Working
Party on Tax Powers, 1991, p.22; Riha, 1992, p.53; Kerr, 1993, p.73; Gabbitas and
Eldridge, 1998, pAO). These findings remain contentious however arid critics await
more rigorous evaluation and more conclusive results.
The State taxation environment in Australia also gives rise to horizontal equity
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concerns in that individuals and businesses are taxed differently depending on their
location (Collins, 1993, pp.164, 175; Gabbitas and Eldridge, 1998, pAl). Tables 3
and 4 indicate the relative tax burdens imposed in different States in terms of the
legal incidence of the relevant taxes, fees and fines.
TABLE 3
STATE TAXES, FEES AND FINES, 1984·85 TO 1998-99:
AGGREGATE ($M)
Year State
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas
1984·85 4,080 3,153 1,299 788 870 238
1985·86 4,620 3,446 1,375 835 932 266
1986-87 4,247 3,889 1,525 916 1,170 310
1987-88 6,392 4,404 1,908 1,071 1,421 365
1988-89 7,511 4,981 2,424 1,249 1,688 413
1989-90 8,093 5,274 2,628 1,305 1,737 458
1990-91 8,407 5,634 2,759 1,472 1,825 506
1991-92 8,972 6,001 2,941 1,5% 1,925 540
1992·93 8,917 6,252 3,058 1,656 1,953 517
1993-94 9,743 7,119 3,396 1,792 2.302 557
1994-95 10,080 7,459 3,693 1,865. 2,442 600
1995-96 10,744 8.320 3,%6 2,Oll 2,563 623
1996-97 ll,798 8.920 4,276 2,108 2.653 630
1997-98 12.907 8.526 4,353 2,271 2.993 631
1998-99 13.804 9,097 4.497 2,362 3,190 646
Source: ABS (Various) Catalogue No. 5506.0
An alternative way of measuring relative tax burdens is taxation revenue as a
proportion of GSP, which for 1998-99 sees Queensland at a low 4,7 percent
compared 10 a national average of 5.8 per cent (Queensland Government, 2000,
pA5), Queensland tax collections represented 7,75 per centofthe Stale's household
disposable income compared with the national average of 8,93%. Table 3 shows
that taxes, fees and fines foraH States have more than doubled between 1984-85 and
1998-99, In Queensland's case, the capacity of its residents to meet their State
taxation liabilities has also been reduced in recent times, since the growth of
Queensland taxes, fees and fines has been consistently stronger than inflation. Riha
(1992, ppA6-53) noted that while household income in Queensland increased by
66 percent between 1985-86 and 1990-91, State taxation increased by 108%, Over
the more recent period 1990-91 to 1998-99, household income in the State rose by
approximately 58 per cent while Queensland taxation revenue increased by
63 per cent (ABS 5506.0, 5220.0). In addition, it should be noted Ihat fees and fines
as a source ofQueensland government revenue have increased in importance from
8 percentofQueensland taxation revenue in 1984-85 (ABS 5506,0) 10 approximately
25 per cent oftaxation revenue in 1998-99 (Queensland Government, 20(0). When
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combined with the increasing user-pays charges and the myriad of concessions,
exemptions, thresholds and multiple rates, the picture is one of narrowing tax bases,
and therefore increased taxation inefficiencies and inequities.
TABLE 4
STATE TAXES, FEES AND FINES PER CAPITA,
1984-85 TO 1998-99
Year State
NSW Vic Qld SA WA T.,
1984-85 750 768 509 576 618 540
1985-86 839 831 528 606 646 598
1986-87 940 928 574 660 789 691
1987-88 1,126 1,038 703 765 935 811
1988-89 1,305 1,158 868 883 1,079 911
1989-90 1,387 1,211 915 914 1,085 988
1990-91 1,431 1,279 939 1,022 1,121 1,103
1991-92 1,510 1,351 977 1,098 1,167 1,156
1992-93 1,485 1,398 983 1,134 1,164 1,096
1993-94 1,608 1,586 1,066 1,222 1,352 1,178
1994-95 1,645 1,651 1,131 1,269 1,408 1,267
1995-96 1,732 1,824 1,188 1,364 1,452 1,313
1996-97 1,881 1,937 1,259 1,425 1,476 1,331
1997-98 2,038 1,832 1,260 1,528 1,636 1,338
1998-99 2,153 1,931 1,280 1,582 1,714 1,374
Source: ABS (Various) Catalogue No. 1350.0 and 5506.0
In its budget for 2000-01, the Queensland Government noted that estimated
2000-01 per capita collections of State taxes, fees and fines in Queensland - at
$1,359 - will remain considerably lower than the average of other States, where,
on average, the tax burden is forecast to be 27,6 per cent higher,
5. THE END OF QUEENSLAND'S LOW TAX DAYS?
Robinson (1998, p,15) maintains that "the crucial point to remember is that the
introduction of the GST will effectively end Queensland's position as a low tax
State," As he puts it (1998, p,15), this simply reflects the fact that the "".new
arrangements will mean the combined total of Commonwealth and state taxes
levied on Queenslanders will rise to about the Australian average, The GSTwill be
levied at a unifonn rate across the country whereas, by contrast, the state taxes
which it would be replacing are levied at different rates in different states - and are
significantly lower in Queensland."
Successive Queensland governments have highlighted the State's low taxation
status. Table 4 shows that in 1998-99, Queensland had the lowest per capita taxes,
fees and fines of $1,280. New South Wales was approximately 68 per cent higher
at $2,153. It must be appreciated, however, that Queensland's low tax status is
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maintained by below-standard levels of service provision. as revealed by Tables 5
and 6.
TABLE 5
STATE SERVICE PROVISION RATIOS, 1985-86 TO 1998-99
(PERCENTAGE OF AUSTRALIAN AVERAGE)
Year State
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas
1985-86 98.1 109.7 83.9 102.8 97.5 103.3
1986-87 99.3 111.6 80.4 103.9 96.9 99.9
1987-88 100.6 111.3 77.7 104.5 100.3 98.7
1988-89 101.4 112.1 76.5 101.3 102.0 98.6
1989-90 100.4 112.3 78.2 101.0 101.2 101.5
1990-91 98.8 112.6 82.8 104.4 96.2 103.3
1991-92 97.9 112.5 85.0 106.2 95.0 104.4
1992-93 95.1 115.6 87.4 106.3 93.0 106.6
1993-94 94.2 122.2 82.9 103.6 93.7 99.4
1994-95 97.4 104.4 92.8 109.5 99.2 98.3
1995-96 98.4 101.0 95.3 109.5 100.1 99.7
1996-97 95.9 100.2 100.0 108.1 104.4 104.3
1997-98 100.5 96.5 96.8 109.2 104.8 96.2
1998-99 100.4 96.3 97.7 108.6 105.9 94.2
Source: Conunonwea1th Grants Conurussion (Various)
TABLE 6
STATE REVENUE·RAISING EFFORT RATIOS, 1985-86 TO 1998-99
(pERCENTAGE OF AUSTRALIAN AVERAGE)
Year State
NSW Vic Qld SA WA Tas
1985-86 103.8 108.9 87.3 104.1 100.7 91.9
1986-87 103.1 106.8 82.7 105.8 106.0 101.0
1987-88 103.2 105.8 80.2 110.0 101.4 103.9
1988-89 102.6 105.0 81.2 113.7 101.0 104.8
1989-90 100.8 103.9 79.6 119.5 108.1 108.5
1990-91 103.4 103.1 85.4 111.2 95.6 110.0
1991-92 104.0 106.0 84.6 104.4 91.9 108.5
1992-93 104.1 105.4 86.0 110.3 89.0 102.9
1993-94 98.0 125.9 76.7 105.2 84.3 97.3
1994-95 102.9 110.3 86.0 109.6 84.0 91.9
1995-96 99.6 110.6 85.8 117.3 89.1 91.8
1996-97 103.9 104.7 91.2 106.3 87.6 94.7
1997-98 103.2 105.2 90.1 116.6 84.9 99.5
1998-99 105.7 95.6 96.3 112.4 92.3 94.9
Source: Commonwealth Grants Commission (Various)
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Table 5 shows the service provision ratio for each State between 1985-86 and
1998-99, relative to the Australian average. Put differently, it illustrates the policy
effort being made by a State in terms of actual expenditure on services compared
with the expenditure which it would have to make to provide services at an
Australian average standard (Rowand Duhs, 1998b, p.69). The data reveal thai
there were considerable variations in lhe level of service provision both within and
among the Slates over the period 1985-8610 1998-99. Queensland service provision
ralios slayed substantially below average. Given sufficientdifferences in efficiency
levels, however, the Queensland government' s service delivery or policy outcomes
would not necessarily be inferior, notwithstanding Queensland's below-average
levels ofexpenditure on services relative to the other states, as revealed in Table 5.
Table 6 presents revenue-raising effort ratios between 1985-86 and 1998-99.
Put simply, it shows the policy effort being made by a State in terms of revenue
being raised from taxes and charges, compared with the revenue a State would raise
if it applied rates of taxes and charges at an average Australian standard. Table 6
shows there was considerable variation in the revenue-raising effort bolh within
and between the States between 1985-86 and 1998-99, and that in the case of
Queensland, revenue-raising effort consistently remained substantially below the
Australian average'.
Overall fiscal symmetry in each State's budgetary stance is shown when Tables
5 and 6 are compared. Victoria and South Australia, for example, can be seen to have
above-average revenue-raising and service provision policies. While Queensland
governments often boast that Queensland is a low tax Stale, they are slowerto add that
Queensland is also a low service provision State. On the whole, it is apparent thai
those States which elected to pursue above-standard levels of service provision also
applied above-standard severity in their revenue-raising efforts.
The analyses undertaken by Queensland Treasury (1998 and 1999) and
Robinson (1998) capture an important economic effect ofreplacing the nominated
Stale taxes with the nalional GST. Nonetheless it does not necessarily follow that
the replacement of the selected State taxes with the national GST will threaten the
Queensland Government's capacity to maintain Queensland's low tax status. Two
explanations are advanced for this. First, the evaluations by Queensland Treasury
and Robinson ignore the States' capacity to alter their relative tax burdens by
adjusting the remaining components of their tax bases (e.g. taxes on payroll,
The Conunonwealth Grants Commission and the Queensland Government adopt different
approaches in calculating the impact of the 1 July 2000 national tax changes on State
revenue-raising effort ratios. Queensland Government estimates reflect actual
Commonwealth and State tax policies during 1997-98 and 1998-99. whereas
Commonwealth Grants Commission 2000 estimates incorporate the effects ofthe States'
tax policies resulting from the national tax changes of 1 July 2000. Queensland
government 2000-01 budget statistics show Queensland's revenue-raising effort as
down from 85.8% in 1995-96 to 81.8% in 1997-98 and 81.4% in 1998-99, while the
Grants Commission approach shows an increase to 90. i and 96.3 of the Australian
average. respectively.
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vehicles, land and gambling). After the elimination of bed taxes and FlO, this can
still be expected to account for approximately 65 per cent of the pre-GST State tax
regime. Moreover, the likelihood of such action occurring is particularly evident
given both the Beattie Government's 1999 decision to reduce payroll tax and the
tendency of the States to circumscribe the broader based taxes available to them
through exemptions and concessions (Rowand Duhs, 1998a, p.61).
Second, given that the Commonwealth Grants Commission principle of fiscal
capacity equalisation will be employed in distributing GST proceeds to the States,
the national GST need not substantially alter the long-run relativities between the
States' taxation stances. The Commission strives to place each State in a position
where it has the fiscal capacity to provide the same level of public services and to
levy taxes at the same rate. Of course, individual States may choose not to do so,
as evidenced by the variations shown above in the States' revenue raising and
expenditure activities. Thus, the Grants Commission methodology, combined with
the States' continued capacity 10 manipulate their own tax bases (and the way they
choose to spend the additional GST revenues made available to them) can be
expected to leave the States with considerable discretion overtheir taxation stances.
There is therefore no reason to suggest that Queensland's days as a low tax State
are necessarily numbered as a result of the GST refonns.
6. CONCLUSIONS
While the GST tax package is now a fact of life, issues of Commonwealth-State
financial relations and VFI remain important (Rowand Duhs, 1998a and 1998b),
if less publicised. In fact, there are various consequences of the refonn agenda for
Commonwealth-Stale financial relations. The initial interim revenue sharing
agreement between the Commonwealth and the States was criticisedon the grounds
that, contrary to the principle offiscal capacity equalisation, Queensland taxpayers
have been required to subsidise the removal of bed taxes and financial institutions
duty (FlO) by other States. Subsequent amendments 10 the revenue-sharing
proposal which received the support of the Queensland Governmenl following
increased Commonwealth financial assistance to the states, still left Queensland
with a revenue shortfall of $130 million per annum. While the States will benefit
to someextentfrom greaterrevenue certainty under the new tax sharingarrangements,
greater fiscal autonomy for the States nonetheless exists only nominally. Conclusion
one therefore is that the VFI problem may be said to be worsened, not improved,
by the tax refonn package. Conclusion two is that inequities remain in the tax
compensation arrangements, despite appeal to one principle or another of fiscal
hannorusation. Although these compensation arrangements are now matters of
record, the fact remains that L~e good offices of subsequent Commonwealth
governments will be appealed to when future disputes and refonns arise, and
concerns about present inequities may yet be brought to bear in future debates.
The refonned revenue sharing agreement between the Commonwealth and the
States has efficiency implications for the overall tax mix and offers the opportunity
to address a number ofconcerns regarding the degree of VA, including its capacity
to partially satisfy the States' desire for greater predictability and certainty in their
annual funding. Conversely, the accountability gains, if any, are likely to be
marginal as revenue sharing only notionally passes responsibility to the States.
Conclusion three is that the potential efficiency gains from increased State revenue
predictability must be assessed against the Commonwealth Government's continued
capacity to control State expenditures through the maintenance of specific purpose
payments (SPPs), together with any inefficiencies attributable to heightened VR.
Moreover, while the GST has attracted much public scrutiny, the fact that the post-
GST State tax regime fares poorly when assessed against the standard tax design
criteria is probably less well appreciated. In terms ofefficiency, State taxes perform
poorly in that they are distortionary and encourage substitution of untaxed forms
ofeconomic activity~ are commonly condemned as inappropriate sources ofmajor
revenues for any level of government; and have been substantially narrowed
through politically induced concessions. Most State taxes also perform poorly
when assessed against equity requirements, alleast according to both the NSW Tax
Taskforce and Nieuwenhuysen, albeit critics continue to ask for more rigorous
evidence. In terms of vertical equity, almost all State taxes are regressive. The State
taxation environment also givesrise to horizontal equity concerns in that individuals
and businesses are taxed differently depending on their location. While the
disparities in tax effort between the States have narrowed over time, differences
remain. Conclusion four is that the national GST may actually enhance economic
efficiency and equity, to the extent that it facilitates reduced reliance on the present
raft of narrowly based State taxes.
Variability in State tax and expenditure regimes remains both possibleand likely.
Contrary to the Queensland Premier's assertion, this paper accordingly finds that the
GSTleviedbytheCommonwealthGovemmentneednotadverselyaffectQueensland's
low taxation status which inany event should not be construed as being unequivocally
good, since it is maintained by below-average levels of service provision. Scope for
debate remains over the extent to which Queensland's low taxi low service provision
mix reflects a conscious choice by the electorate, the extent to which the electorate
is less aware of the low service provision than of the low tax status, and of the
possibility that service provision as measured by the Commonwealth Grants
Commission is misleadingbecauseofinadequateallowance for efficiencydifferences.
Nevertheless, the States will maintain a significant proportion oftheir State tax bases,
and considerable discretion remains available to Queensland governments over both
tax and expenditure regimes. Conclusion five is that Queensland's days as a low tax
State are not necessarily numbered, although the scope for maintaining the pre-GST
extent of the differential in State taxes may be circumscribed.
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